Cyber Security of Water SCADA Systems-Part I: Analysis and Experimentation of Stealthy Deception Attacks

TitleCyber Security of Water SCADA Systems-Part I: Analysis and Experimentation of Stealthy Deception Attacks
Publication TypeJournal Article
Year of Publication2012
AuthorsAmin, S., X. Litrico, S. Sastry, and A. M. Bayen
JournalControl Systems Technology, IEEE Transactions on
VolumePP
Pagination1
ISSN1063-6536
KeywordsDelay systems, fault diagnosis, intrusion detection, supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems, supervisory control.
Abstract

This brief aims to perform security threat assessment of networked control systems with regulatory and supervisory control layers. We analyze the performance of a proportional-integral controller (regulatory layer) and a model-based diagnostic scheme (supervisory layer) under a class of deception attacks. We adopt a conservative approach by assuming that the attacker has knowledge of: 1) the system dynamics; 2) the parameters of the diagnostic scheme; and 3) the sensor-control signals. The deception attack presented here can enable remote water pilfering from automated canal systems. We also report a field-operational test attack on the Gignac canal system located in Southern France.

DOI10.1109/TCST.2012.2211873