|Title||Cyber Security of Water SCADA Systems - Part I: Analysis and Experimentation of Stealthy Deception Attacks|
|Publication Type||Journal Article|
|Year of Publication||2013|
|Authors||Amin, S.., X.. Litrico, S.. Sastry, and A.. M. Bayen|
|Journal||IEEE Transactions on Control Systems Technology|
|Keywords||automated canal systems, canals, Computer crime, computer network security, control engineering computing, Control systems, Cyber security, Delay systems, fault diagnosis, field-operational test attack, Gignac canal system, intrusion detection, model-based diagnostic scheme, networked control systems, Observers, PI control, proportional-integral controller, regulatory layers, remote water pilfering, SCADA systems, security threat assessment, sensor-control signals, sensors, Southern France, stealthy deception attacks, Supervisory control, supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems, supervisory control and data acquisition systems, supervisory control layers, system dynamics, water SCADA systems|
This brief aims to perform security threat assessment of networked control systems with regulatory and supervisory control layers. We analyze the performance of a proportional-integral controller (regulatory layer) and a model-based diagnostic scheme (supervisory layer) under a class of deception attacks. We adopt a conservative approach by assuming that the attacker has knowledge of: 1) the system dynamics; 2) the parameters of the diagnostic scheme; and 3) the sensor-control signals. The deception attack presented here can enable remote water pilfering from automated canal systems. We also report a field-operational test attack on the Gignac canal system located in Southern France.