A distributed strategy for electricity distribution network control in the face of DER compromises

TitleA distributed strategy for electricity distribution network control in the face of DER compromises
Publication TypeConference Papers
Year of Publication2015
AuthorsShelar, D., J. Giraldo, and S. Amin
Conference Name2015 54th IEEE Conference on Decision and Control (CDC)
Date PublishedDec
Keywordsattacker-defender interaction, control system synthesis, Decentralized control, Density estimation robust algorithm, DER set-points, distributed control, distributed control design problem, distributed energy resources, distributed power generation, distribution utility response, electricity distribution network control, frequency control, frequency regulation, game theory, Generators, load control, Load modeling, load regulation, Mathematical model, power distribution control, power generation control, power system security, security attacks, Stackelberg game, supply-demand mismatch, Volt-Var control, Voltage control, voltage regulation

We focus on the question of distributed control of electricity distribution networks in the face of security attacks to Distributed Energy Resources (DERs). Our attack model includes strategic manipulation of DER set-points by an external hacker to induce a sudden compromise of a subset of DERs connected to the network. We approach the distributed control design problem in two stages. In the first stage, we model the attacker-defender interaction as a Stackelberg game. The attacker (leader) disconnects a subset of DERs by sending them wrong set-point signals. The distribution utility (follower) response includes Volt-VAR control of non-compromised DERs and load control. The objective of the attacker (resp. defender) is to maximize (resp. minimize) the weighted sum of the total cost due to loss of frequency regulation and the cost due to loss of voltage regulation. In the second stage, we propose a distributed control (defender response) strategy for each local controller such that, if sudden supply-demand mismatch is detected (for example, due to DER compromises), the local controllers automatically respond based on their respective observations of local fluctuations in voltage and frequency. This strategy aims to achieve diversification of DER functions in the sense that each uncompromised DER node either contributes to voltage regulation (by contributing reactive power) or to frequency regulation (by contributing active power). We illustrate the effectiveness of this control strategy on a benchmark network.